In recent years SCADA systems have become the target of cyber attacks. Safety-critical systems are no longer isolated, as web-based applications expose strategic infrastructures to the outside world connection. In a cyber-warfare context, we propose a Model Predictive Control architecture with adaptive resilience, capable of guaranteeing control performance in normal operating conditions and driving towards resilience against DoS (controller-actuator) attacks when needed. Since the attackers' goal is to maximize the system damage, we assume they solve an adversarial optimal control problem. An adaptive resilience factor is derived from the intensity function of a Hawkes model, a point process estimating the occurrence of random events in time, trained on a moving window to estimate the next attack return time. We consider 2 attack scenarios with time-varying period and pseudo-random attack return time on the regulated Olginate dam of Lake Como.

The seminar is part of the Systems & Control Ph.D. Seminar Series. See the event program for further information.